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Abstract
Differentially private statistical estimation has seen a flurry of developments over
the last several years. Study has been divided into two schools of thought, focusing on
empirical statistics versus population statistics. We suggest that these two lines of work
are more similar than different by giving examples of methods that were initially framed
for empirical statistics, but can be applied just as well to population statistics. We also
provide a thorough coverage of recent work in this area.
1 Introduction
Statistics and machine learning are now ubiquitous in data analysis. Given a dataset, one
immediately wonders what it allows us to infer about the underlying population. However,
modern datasets don’t exist in a vacuum: they often contain sensitive information about
the individuals they represent. Without proper care, statistical procedures will result in
gross violations of privacy. Motivated by the shortcomings of ad hoc methods for data
anonymization, Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith introduced the celebrated notion of
differential privacy [DMNS06].
From its inception, some of the driving motivations for differential privacy were applications
in statistics and the social sciences, notably disclosure limitation for the US Census. And yet,
the lion’s share of differential privacy research has taken place within the computer science
community. As a result, the specific applications being studied are often not formulated using
statistical terminology, or even as statistical problems. Perhaps most significantly, much of the
early work in computer science (though definitely not all) focus on estimating some property
of a dataset rather than estimating some property of an underlying population.
Although the earliest works exploring the interaction between differential privacy and
classical statistics go back to at least 2009 [VS09, FRY10], the emphasis on differentially
private statistical inference in the computer science literature is somewhat more recent.
However, while earlier results on differential privacy did not always formulate problems in a
statistical language, statistical inference was a key motivation for most of this work. As a
result many of the techniques that were developed have direct applications in statistics, for
example establishing minimax rates for estimation problems.
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The purpose of this series of blog posts is to highlight some of those results in the computer
science literature, and present them in a more statistical language. Specifically, we will discuss:
• Tight minimax lower bounds for privately estimating the mean of a multivariate dis-
tribution over Rd, using the technique of tracing attacks developed in [BUV14, SU17a,
DSS+15, BSU17, SU17b, KLSU19].
• Upper bounds for estimating a distribution in Kolmogorov distance, using the ubiquitous
binary-tree mechanism introduced in [DNPR10, CSS11].
In particular, we hope to encourage computer scientists working on differential privacy
to pay more attention to the applications of their methods in statistics, and share with
statisticians many of the powerful techniques that have been developed in the computer
science literature.
1.1 Formulating Private Statistical Inference
Essentially every differentially private statistical estimation task can be phrased using the
following setup. We are given a dataset X = (X1, . . . , Xn) of size n, and we wish to design an
algorithm M ∈M where M is the class of mechanisms that are both:
1. differentially private, and
2. accurate, either in expectation or with high probability, according to some task-specific
measure.
A few comments about this framework are in order. First, although the accuracy requirement
is stochastic in nature (i.e., an algorithm might not be accurate depending on the randomness
of the algorithm and the data generation process), the privacy requirement is worst-case in
nature. That is, the algorithm must protect privacy for every dataset X, even those we believe
are very unlikely.
Second, the accuracy requirement is stated rather vaguely. This is because the notion of
accuracy of an algorithm is slightly more nuanced, depending on whether we are concerned
with empirical or population statistics. A particular emphasis of these blog posts is to explore
the difference (or, as we will see, the lack of a difference) between these two notions of accuracy.
The former estimates a quantity of the observed dataset, while the latter estimates a quantity
of an unobserved distribution which is assumed to have generated the dataset.
More precisely, the former can be phrased in terms of empirical loss, of the form:
min
M∈M
max
X∈X
E
M
(`(M(X), f(X))),
where M is some class of randomized estimators (e.g., differentially private estimators), X is
some class of datasets, f is some quantity of interest, and ` is some loss function. That is,
we’re looking to find an estimator that has small expected loss on any dataset in some class.
In contrast, statistical minimax theory looks at statements about population loss, of the
form:
min
M∈M
max
P∈P
E
X∼P,M
(`(M(X), f(P ))),
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where P is some family of distributions over datasets (typically consisting of i.i.d. samples).
That is, we’re looking to find an estimator that has small expected loss on random data
from any distribution in some class. In particular, note that the randomness in this objective
additionally includes the data generating procedure X ∼ P .
These two formulations are formally very different in several ways. First, the empirical
formulation requires an estimator to have small loss on worst-case datasets, whereas the
statistical formulation only requires the estimator to have small loss on average over datasets
drawn from certain distributions. Second, the statistical formulation requires that we estimate
the unknown quantity f(P ), and thus necessitates a solution to the non-private estimation
problem. On the other hand, the empirical formulation only asks us to estimate the known
quantity f(X), and thus if there were no privacy constraint it would always be possible to
compute f(X) exactly. Third, typically in the statistical formulation, we require that the
dataset is drawn i.i.d., which means that we are more constrained when proving lower bounds
for estimation than we are in the empirical problem.
However, in practice,1 these two formulations are more alike than they are different,
and results about one formulation often imply results about the other formulation. On the
algorithmic side, classical statistical results will often tell us that `(f(X), f(P )) is small, in
which case algorithms that guarantee `(M(X), f(X)) is small also guarantee `(M(X), f(P ))
is small.
Moreover, typical lower bound arguments for empirical quantities are often statistical in
nature. These typically involving constructing some simple “hard distribution” over datasets
such that no private algorithm can estimate well on average for this distribution, and thus
these lower bound arguments also apply to estimating population statistics for some simple
family of distributions.
We will proceed to give some examples of estimation problems that were originally
studied by computer scientists with the empirical formulation in mind. These results either
implicitly or explicitly provide solutions to the corresponding population versions of the same
problems—our goal is to spell out and illustrate these connections.
2 Differential Privacy Background
Let X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) ∈ X n be a collection of n samples where each individual sample
comes from the domain X . We say that two samples X,X ′ ∈ X ∗ are adjacent, denoted
X ∼ X ′, if they differ on at most one individual sample. Intuitively, a randomized algorithm
M , which is often called a mechanism for historical reasons, is differentially private if the
distribution of M(X) and M(X ′) are similar for every pair of adjacent samples X,X ′.
Definition 2.1 ([DMNS06]). A mechanism M : X n → R is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for
every pair of adjacent datasets X ∼ X ′, and every (measurable) R ⊆ R
P(M(X) ∈ R) ≤ eε · P(M(X ′) ∈ R)+ δ.
We let Mε,δ denote the set of mechanisms that satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
1More precisely, in the practice of doing theoretical research.
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Remark 2.2. To simplify notation, and to maintain consistency with the literature, we adopt
the convention of defining the mechanism only for a fixed sample size n. What this means in
practice is that the mechanisms we describe treat the sample size n is public information that
need not be kept private. While one could define a more general model where n is not fixed, it
wouldn’t add anything to this discussion other than additional complexity.
Remark 2.3. In these blog posts, we stick to the most general formulation of differential
privacy, so-called approximate differential privacy, i.e. (ε, δ)-differential privacy for δ > 0
essentially because this is the notion that captures the widest variety of private mechanisms.
Almost all of what follows would apply equally well, with minor technical modifications, to
slightly stricter notions of concentrated differential privacy [DR16, BS16, BDRS18], Re´nyi
differential privacy [Mir17], or Gaussian differential privacy [DRS19]. While so-called pure
differential privacy, i.e. (ε, 0)-differential privacy has also been studied extensively, this notion
is artificially restrictive and excludes many differentially private mechanisms.
A key property of differential privacy that helps when desinging efficient estimators is
closure under postprocessing :
Lemma 2.4 (Post-Processing [DMNS06]). If M : X n → R is (ε, δ)-differentially private and
M ′ : R → R′ is any randomized algorithm, then M ′ ◦M is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
The estimators we present in this work will use only one tool for achieving differential
privacy, the Gaussian Mechanism.
Lemma 2.5 (Gaussian Mechanism). Let f : X n → Rd be a function and let
∆f = sup
X∼X′
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖2
denote its `2-sensitivity. The Gaussian mechanism
M(X) = f(X) +N
(
0,
2 log(2/δ)
ε2
·∆2f · Id×d
)
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
3 Mean Estimation in Rd
Let’s take a dive into the problem of private mean estimation for some family P of multivariate
distributions over Rd. This problem has been studied for various families P and various
choices of loss function. Here we focus on perhaps the simplest variant of the problem, in
which P contains distributions of bounded support [±1]d and the loss is the `22 error. We
emphasize, however, that the methods we discuss here are quite versatile and can be used to
derive minimax bounds for other variants of the mean-estimation problem.
Note that, by a simple argument, the non-private minimax rate for this class is achieved
by the empirical mean, and is
max
P∈P
E
X1···n∼P
(‖X − µ‖22) = dn. (1)
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The main goal of this section is to derive the minimax bound
min
M∈M
ε, 1n
max
P∈P
E
X1···n∼P
(‖M(X1···n)− µ‖22) = dn + Θ˜
(
d2
ε2n2
)
.2 (2)
The proof of this lower bound is based on robust tracing attacks, also called membership
inference attacks, which were developed in a chain of papers [BUV14, SU17a, DSS+15, BSU17,
SU17b, KLSU19]. We remark that this lower bound is almost identical to the minimax bound
for mean estimation proven in the much more recent work of Cai, Wang, and Zhang [CWZ19],
but it lacks tight dependence on the parameter δ, which we discuss in the following remark.
Remark 3.1. The choice of δ = 1/n in (2) may look strange at first. For the upper bound
this choice is arbitrary—as we will see, we can upper bound the rate for any δ > 0 at a cost of
a factor of O(log(1/δ)). The lower bound applies only when δ ≤ 1/n. Note that the rate is
qualitatively different when δ  1/n. However, we emphasize that (ε, δ)-differential privacy is
not a meaningful privacy notion unless δ  1/n. In particular, the mechanism that randomly
outputs δn elements of the sample satisfies (0, δ)-differential privacy. However, when δ  1/n,
this mechanism completely violates the privacy of  1 person in the dataset. Moreover, taking
the empirical mean of these δn samples gives rate d/δn, which would violate our lower bound
when δ is large enough. On the other hand, we would expect the minimax rate to become
slower when δ  1/n. This expectation is, in fact, correct, however the proof we present
does not give the tight dependence on the parameter δ. See [SU17a] for a refinement that can
obtain the right dependence on δ, and [CWZ19] for the details of how to apply this refinement
in the i.i.d. setting.
3.1 A Simple Upper Bound
Theorem 3.2. For every n ∈ N, and every ε, δ > 0, there exists an (ε, δ)-differentially private
private mechanism M such that
max
P∈P
E
X1···n∼P
(‖M(X1···n)− µ‖22) ≤ dn + 2d2 log(2/δ)ε2n2 . (3)
Proof. Define the mechanism
M(X1···n) = X +N
(
0,
2d log(2/δ)
ε2n2
· Id×d
)
. (4)
This mechanism satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy by Lemma 2.5, noting that for any pair of
adjacent samples X1···n and X ′1···n, ‖X −X ′‖22 ≤ dn2 .
Let σ2 = 2d log(2/δ)
ε2n2
. Note that since the Gaussian noise has mean 0 and is independent of
2Θ˜(f(n)) is a slight abuse of notation – it refers to a function which is both O(f(n) logc1 f(n)) and
Ω(f(n) logc2 f(n)) for some constants c1, c2.
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X − µ, we have
E
(‖M(X1···n)− µ‖22) = E(‖X − µ‖22)+ E(‖M(X1···n)−X‖22)
≤ d
n
+ E
(‖M(X1···n)−X‖22)
=
d
n
+ E
(‖N (0, σ2Id×d)‖22)
=
d
n
+ σ2d
=
d
n
+
2d2 log(2/δ)
ε2n2
.
3.2 Minimax Lower Bounds via Tracing
Theorem 3.3. For every n, d ∈ N, ε > 0, and δ < 1/96n, if P is the class of all product
distributions on {±1}d, then for some constant C > 0,
min
M∈Mε,δ
max
P∈P
E
X1···n∼P,M
(‖M(X1···n)− µ‖22) = Ω(min{ d2ε2n2 , d
})
.
Note that it is trivial to achieve error d for any distribution using the mechanism
M(X1···n) ≡ 0, so the result says that the error must be Ω(d2/ε2n2) whenever this error is
significantly smaller than the trivial error of d.
3.2.1 Tracing Attacks
Before giving the formal proof, we will try to give some intuition for the high-level proof
strategy. The proof can be viewed as constructing a tracing attack [DSSU17] (sometimes
called a membership inference attack) of the following form. There is an attacker who has the
data of some individual Y chosen in one of the two ways: either Y is a random element of the
sample X, or Y is an independent random sample from the population P . The attacker is
given access to the true distribution P and the outcome of the mechanism M(X), and wants
to determine which of the two is the case. If the attacker can succeed, then M cannot be
differentially private. To understand why this is the case, if Y is a member of the dataset,
then the attacker should say Y is in the dataset, but if we consider the adjacent dataset X ′
where we replace Y with some independent sample from P , then the attacker will now say Y
is independent of the dataset. Thus, M(X) and M(X ′) cannot be close in the sense required
by differential privacy.
Thus, the proof works by constructing a test statistic Z = Z(M(X), Y, P ), that the
attacker can use to distinguish the two possibilities for Y . In particular, we show that there
is a distribution over populations P such that E(Z) is small when Y is independent of X, but
for every sufficiently accurate mechanism M , E(Z) is large when Y is a random element of X.
3.2.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
The proof of Theorem 3.3 that we present closely follows the one that appears in Thomas
Steinke’s Ph.D. thesis [Ste16].
6
We start by constructing a “hard distribution” over the family of product distributions P .
Let µ = (µ1, . . . , µd) ∈ [−1, 1]d consist of d independent draws from the uniform distribution on
[−1, 1] and let Pµ be the product distribution over {±1}d with mean µ. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∼ Pµ
and X = (X1, . . . , Xn).
Let M : {±1}n×d → [±1]d be any (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism and let
α2 = E
µ,X,M
(‖M(X)− µ‖22) (5)
be its expected loss. We will prove the desired lower bound on α2.
For every element i, we define the random variables
Zi = Zi(M(X), Xi, µ) = 〈M(X)− µ,Xi − µ〉 (6)
Z ′i = Z
′
i(M(X∼i), Xi, µ) = 〈M(X∼i)− µ,Xi − µ〉, (7)
where X∼i denotes (X1, . . . , X ′i, . . . , Xn) where X
′
i is an independent sample from Pµ. Our
goal will be to show that, privacy and accuracy imply both upper and lower bounds on
E(
∑
i Zi) that depend on α, and thereby obtain a bound on α
2.
The first claim says that, when Xi is not in the sample, then the likelihood random
variable has mean 0 and variance controlled by the expected `22 error of the mechanism.
Claim 3.4. For every i, E(Z ′i) = 0, Var(Z ′i) ≤ 4α2, and ‖Z ′i‖∞ ≤ 4d.
Proof of Claim 3.4. Conditioned on any value of µ, M(X∼i) is independent fromXi. Moreover,
E(Xi − µ) = 0, so we have
E
µ,X,M
(〈M(X∼i)− µ,Xi − µ〉) = E
µ
(
E
X,M
(〈M(X∼i)− µ,Xi − µ〉)
)
= E
µ
(〈
E
X,M
(M(X∼i)− µ), E
X,M
(Xi − µ)
〉)
= E
µ
(〈
E
X,M
(M(X∼i)− µ), 0
〉)
= 0.
For the second part of the claim, since (Xi−µ)2 ≤ 4, we have Var(Z ′i) ≤ 4·E
(‖M(X)− µ‖22) =
4α2. The final part of the claim follows from the fact that every entry of M(X∼i)− µ and
Xi − µ is bounded by 2 in absolute value, and Z ′i is a sum of d such entries, so its absolute
value is always at most 4d.
The next claim says that, because M is differentially private, Zi has similar expectation
to Z ′i, and thus its expectation is also small.
Claim 3.5. E(
∑n
i=1 Zi) ≤ 4nαε+ 8nδd.
Proof. The proof is a direct calculation using the following inequality, whose proof is relatively
simple using the definition of differential privacy:
E(Zi) ≤ E
(
Z ′i
)
+ 2ε
√
Var(Z ′i) + 2δ‖Z ′i‖∞. (8)
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Given the inequality and Claim 3.4, we have
E(Zi) ≤ 0 + (2ε)(2α) + (2δ)(2d) = 4εα+ 8δd.
The claim now follows by summing over all i.
The final claim says that, because M is accurate, the expected sum of the random variables
Zi is large.
Claim 3.6. E(
∑n
i=1 Zi) ≥ d3 − α2.
The proof relies on the following key lemma, whose proof we omit.
Lemma 3.7 (Fingerprinting Lemma [BSU17]). If µ ∈ [±1] is sampled uniformly, X1, . . . , Xn ∈
{±1}n are sampled independently with mean µ, and f : {±1}n → [±1] is any function, then
E
µ,X
(
(f(X)− µ) ·
n∑
i=1
(Xi − µ)
)
≥ 1
3
− E
µ,X
(
(f(X)− µ)2).
The lemma is somewhat technical, but for intuition, consider the case where f(X) =
1
n
∑
iXi is the empirical mean. In this case we have
E
µ,X
(
(f(X)− µ) ·
n∑
i=1
(Xi − µ)
)
= E
µ
(
1
n
∑
i
E
X
(
(Xi − µ)2
))
= E
µ
(Var(Xi)) =
1
3
.
The lemma says that, when µ is sampled this way, then any modification of f that reduces the
correlation between f(X) and
∑
iXi will increase the mean-squared-error of f proportionally.
Proof of Claim 3.6. We can apply the lemma to each coordinate of the estimate M(X).
E
(
n∑
i=1
Zi
)
= E
(
n∑
i=1
〈M(X)− µ,Xi − µ〉
)
=
d∑
j=1
E
(
(M j(X)− µj) ·
n∑
i=1
(Xji − µj)
)
≥
d∑
j=1
(
1
3
− E((M j(X)− µj)2)) (Lemma 3.7)
=
d
3
− E(‖M(X)− µ‖22) = d3 − α2.
Combining Claims 3.5 and 3.6 gives
d
3
− α2 ≤ 4nαε+ 8nδd. (9)
Now, if α2 ≥ d6 then we’re done, so we’ll assume that α2 ≤ d6 . Further, by our assumption on
the value of δ, 8nδd ≤ d12 . In this case we can rearrange terms and square both sides to obtain
α2 ≥ 1
16ε2n2
(
d
3
− α2 − 8nδd
)2
≥ 1
16ε2n2
(
d
12
)2
=
d2
2304ε2n2
. (10)
Combining the two cases for α2 gives α2 ≥ min{d6 , d
2
2304ε2n2
}, as desired.
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4 CDF Estimation for Discrete, Univariate Distributions
Suppose we have a distribution P over the ordered, discrete domain {1, . . . , D} and let
P be the family of all such distributions. The CDF of the distribution is the function
ΦP : {1, . . . , D} → [0, 1] given by
ΦP (j) = P(P ≤ j). (11)
A natural measure of distance between CDFs is the `∞ distance, as this is the sort of
convergence guarantee that the empirical CDF satisfies. That is, in the non-private setting,
the empirical CDF will achieve the minimax rate, which it known by [DKW56, Mas90] to be
max
P∈P
E
X1···n∼P
(‖ΦX − ΦP ‖∞) = O
(√
1
n
)
. (12)
4.1 Private CDF Estimation
Theorem 4.1. For every n ∈ N and every ε, δ > 0, there exists an (ε, δ)-differentially private
mechanism M such that
max
P∈P
E
X1···n∼P
(‖M(X1···n)− ΦP ‖∞) = O
(√
1
n
+
log3/2(D) log1/2(1/δ)
εn
)
. (13)
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that D = 2d for an integer d ≥ 1. Let X1···n ∼ P be
a sample. By the triangle inequality, we have
E
X1···n∼P
(‖M(X1···n)− ΦP ‖∞) ≤ E
X1···n∼P
(‖ΦX − ΦP ‖∞ + ‖M(X1···n)− ΦX‖∞)
≤ O(
√
1/n) + E
X1···n∼P
(‖M(X1···n)− ΦX‖∞),
so we will focus on constructing M to approximate ΦX .
For any ` = 0, . . . , d− 1 and j = 1, . . . , 2d−`, consider the statistics
f`,j(X1···n) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{(j − 1)2` + 1 ≤ Xi ≤ j2`}. (14)
Let f : {1, . . . , D}n → [0, 1]2D−2 be the function whose output consists of all 2D − 2 such
counts. To decipher this notation, for a given `, the counts f`,· form a histogram of X1···n
using consecutive bins of width 2`, and we consider the log(D) histograms of geometrically
increasing width 1, 2, 4, . . . , D.
First, we claim that the function f has low sensitivity—for adjacent samples X and X ′,
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖22 ≤
2 log(D)
n2
. (15)
Thus, we can use the Gaussian mechanism:
M ′(X1···n) = f(X1···n) +N
(
0,
2 log(D) log(1/δ)
ε2n2
· I2D×2D
)
. (16)
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As we will argue, there exists a matrix A ∈ R2D×2D such that ΦX = A · f(X1···n). We will
let M(X1···n) = A ·M ′(X1···n). Since differential privacy is closed under post-processing, M
inherits the privacy of M ′.
We will now show how to construct the matrix A and analyze the error of M . For any
j = 1, . . . , D, we can form the interval {1, . . . , j} as the union of at most logD disjoint
intervals of the form we’ve computed, and therefore we can obtain ΦX(j) as the sum of at
most logD of the entries of f(X). For example, if j = 5 then we can write
{1, . . . , 7} = {1, . . . , 4} ∪ {5, 6} ∪ {7} (17)
and
ΦX(5) = f2,1 + f1,3 + f0,7. (18)
See Figure 1 for a visual representation of the decomposition. Thus we can construct the
matrix A using this information.
Figure 1: A diagram showing the hierarchical decomposition of the domain {1, . . . , 8} using
14 intervals. The highlighted squares represent the interval {1, . . . , 7} and the highlighted
circles show the decomposition of this interval into a union of 3 intervals in the tree.
Note that each entry of Af(X) is the sum of at most log(D) entries of f(X). Thus, if we
use the output of M ′(X1···n) in place of f(X1···n), for every j we obtain
ΦX(j) +N (0, σ2) for σ2 = 2 log
2(D) log(1/δ)
ε2n2
. (19)
Applying standard bounds on the expected supremum of a Gaussian process, we have
E(‖M(X1···n)− ΦX‖∞) = O(σ
√
logD) = O
(
log3/2(D) log1/2(1/δ)
εn
)
. (20)
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4.2 Why Restrict the Domain?
A drawback of the estimator we constructed is that it only applies to distributions of finite
support {1, 2, . . . , D}, albeit with a relatively mild dependence on the support size. If privacy
isn’t a concern, then no such restriction is necessary, as the bound (12) applies equally well to
any distribution over R. Can we construct a differentially private estimator for distributions
with infinite support?
Perhaps surprisingly, the answer to this question is no! Any differentially private estimator
for the CDF of the distribution has to have a rate that depends on the support size, and
cannot give non-trivial rates for distributions with infinite support.
Theorem 4.2 ([BNSV15]). If P consists of all distributions on {1, . . . , D}, then
min
M∈M
1, 1n
max
P∈P
E
X1···n∼P
(‖M(X1···n)− ΦP ‖∞) = Ω
(
log∗D
n
)
.3 (21)
We emphasize that this theorem shouldn’t meet with too much alarm, as log∗D grows
remarkably slowly with D. There are differentially private CDF estimators that achieve very
mild dependence on D [BNS13, BNSV15], including one nearly matching the lower bound
in Theorem 4.2. Moreover, if we want to estimate a distribution over R, and are willing to
make some mild regularity conditions on the distribution, then we can approximate it by a
distribution with finite support and only increase the rate slightly. However, what Theorem 4.2
shows is that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to private CDF estimation that achieves
similar guarantees to the empirical CDF. That is, the right algorithm has to be tailored
somewhat to the application and the assumptions we can make about the distribution.
5 More Private Statistics
Of course, the story doesn’t end here! There’s a whole wide world of differentially private
statistics beyond what we’ve mentioned already. We proceed to survey just a few other
directions of study in private statistics.
5.1 Parameter and Distribution Estimation
A number of the early works in differential privacy give methods for differentially private
statistical estimation for i.i.d. data. The earliest works [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, DMNS06],
which introduced the Gaussian mechanism, among other foundational results, can be thought of
as methods for estimating the mean of a distribution over the hypercube {0, 1}d in the `∞ norm.
Tight lower bounds for this problem follow from the tracing attacks introduced in [BUV14,
SU17a, DSS+15, BSU17, SU17b]. A very recent work of Acharya, Sun, and Zhang [ASZ20]
adapts classical tools for proving estimation and testing lower bounds (lemmata of Assouad,
Fano, and Le Cam) to the differentially private setting. Steinke and Ullman [SU17b] give
tight minimax lower bounds for the weaker guarantee of selecting the largest coordinates of
the mean, which were refined by Cai, Wang, and Zhang [CWZ19] to give lower bounds for
sparse mean-estimation problems.
3The notation log∗D refers to the iterated logarithm.
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Nissim, Raskhodnikova, and Smith introduced the highly general sample-and-aggregate
paradigm, which they apply to several learning problems (e.g., learning mixtures of Gaus-
sians) [NRS07]. Later, Smith [Smi11] showed that this paradigm can be used to transform
any estimator for any asymptotically normal, univariate statistic over a bounded data domain
into a differentially private one with the same asymptotic convergence rate.
Subsequent work has focused on both relaxing the assumptions in [Smi11], particularly
boundedness, and on giving finite-sample guarantees. Karwa and Vadhan investigated the
problem of Gaussian mean estimation, proving the first near-optimal bounds for this set-
ting [KV18]. In particular, exploiting concentration properties of Gaussian data allows us to
achieve non-trivial results even with unbounded data, which is impossible in general. Following
this, Kamath, Li, Singhal, and Ullman moved to the multivariate setting, investigating the
estimation of Gaussians and binary product distributions in total variation distance [KLSU19].
In certain cases (i.e., Gaussians with identity covariance), this is equivalent to mean estimation
in `2-distance, though not always. For example, for binary product distribution, one must
estimate the mean in a type of χ2-distance instead. The perspective of distribution estimation
rather than parameter estimation can be valuable. Bun, Kamath, Steinke, and Wu [BKSW19]
develop a primitive for private hypothesis selection, which they apply to learn any coverable
class of distributions under pure differential privacy. Through the lens of distribution estima-
tion, their work implies an upper bound for mean estimation of binary product distributions
that bypasses lower bounds for the same problem in the empirical setting. In addition to work
on mean estimation in the sub-Gaussian setting, such as the results discussed earlier, mean
estimation has also been studied under weaker moment conditions [BS19, KSU20]. Beyond
these settings, there has also been study of estimation of discrete multinomials, including
estimation in Kolmogorov distance [BNSV15] and in total variation distance for structured
distributions [DHS15], and parameter estimation of Markov Random Fields [ZKKW20].
A different approach to constructing differentially private estimators is based on robust
statistics. This approah begins with the influential work of Dwork and Lei [DL09], which
introduced the propose-test-release framework, and applied to estimating robust statistics
such as the median and interquartile range. While the definitions in robust statistics and
differential privacy are semantically similar, formal connections between the two remain
relatively scant, which suggests a productive area for future study.
5.2 Hypothesis Testing
An influential work of Homer et al. [HSR+08] demonstrated the vulnerability of classical
statistics in a genomic setting, showing that certain χ2-statistics on many different variables
could allow an attacker to determine the presence of an individual in a genome-wide association
study (GWAS). Motivated by these concerns, an early line of work from the statistics
community focused on addressing these issues [VS09, USF13, YFSU14].
More recently, work on private hypothesis testing can be divided roughly into two lines.
The first focuses on the minimax sample complexity, in a line initiated by Cai, Daskalakis, and
Kamath [CDK17], who give an algorithm for privately testing goodness-of-fit (more precisely, a
statistician might refer to this problem as one-sample testing of multinomial data). A number
of subsequent works have essentially settled the complexity of this problem [ASZ18, ADR18],
giving tight upper and lower bounds. Other papers in this line study related problems, including
the two-sample version of the problem, independence testing, and goodness-of-fit testing for
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multivariate product distributions [ASZ18, ADR18, ADKR19, CKM+19b]. A related paper
studies the minimax sample complexity of property estimation, rather than testing of discrete
distributions, including support size and entropy [AKSZ18]. Other recent works in this
vein focus on testing of simple hypotheses [CKM+18, CKM+19a]. In particular [CKM+19a]
proves an analogue of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma for differentially private testing of simple
hypotheses. A paper of Awan and Slavkovic [AS18] gives a universally optimal test when the
domain size is two, however Brenner and Nissim [BN14] shows that such universally optimal
tests cannot exist when the domain has more than two elements. A related problem in this
space is private change-point detection [CKM+18, CKM+19a, CKLZ19] – in this setting, we
are given a time series of datapoints which are sampled from a distribution, which at some
point, changes to a different distribution. The goal is to (privately) determine when this point
occurs.
Complementary to minimax hypothesis testing, a line of work [WLK15, GLRV16, KR17,
KSF17, CBRG18, SGHG+19, CKS+19] designs differentially private versions of popular test
statistics for testing goodness-of-fit, closeness, and independence, as well as private ANOVA,
focusing on the performance at small sample sizes. Work by Wang et al. [WKLK18] focuses
on generating statistical approximating distributions for differentially private statistics, which
they apply to hypothesis testing problems.
5.3 Differential Privacy on Graphs
There is a significant amount of work on differentially private analysis of graphs. We remark
that these algorithms can satisfy either edge or node differential privacy. The former (easier)
guarantee defines a neighboring graph to be one obtained by adding or removing a single
edge, while in the latter (harder) setting, a neighboring graph is one that can be obtained by
modifying the set of edges connected to a single node. The main challenge in this area is that
most graph statistics can have high sensitivity in the worst-case.
The initial works in this area focused on the empirical setting, and goals range from counting
subgraphs [KRSY11, BBDS13, KNRS13, CZ13, RS16] to outputting a privatized graph which
approximates the original [GRU12, BBDS12, Upa13, AU19, EKKL20]. In contrast to the
setting discussed in most of this series, it seems that there are larger qualitative differences
between the study of empirical and population statistics due to the fact that many graph
statistics have high worst-case sensitivity, but may have smaller sensitivity on typical graphs
from many natural models.
In the population statistics setting, recent work has focused on parameter estimation of the
underlying random graph model. So far this work has given estimators for the β-model [KS16]
and graphons [BCS15, BCSZ18]. Graphons are a generalization of the stochastic block model,
which is, in turn, a generalization of the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model. Interestingly, the methods of
Lipschitz-extensions introduced in the empirical setting by [BBDS13, KNRS13] are the main
tool used in the statistical setting as well. While the first works on private graphon estimation
were not computationally efficient, a recent focus has been on obviating these issues for certain
important cases, such as the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi setting [SU19].
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